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Coming to Terms with Dred Scott:  
A Response to Daniel A. Farber 
Paul Finkelman* 
I.    INTRODUCTION 
II.    THE LEGITIMACY OF THE TANEY OPINION AND THE DECISION-
MAKING PROCESS 
III.    DID DRED SCOTT CAUSE THE CIVIL WAR? 
IV.    WAS THE CASE WRONGLY DECIDED? 
V.    WAS THE JURISDICTIONAL ISSUE CORRECTLY DECIDED? 
VI.    DID THE COURT OVERREACH IN STRIKING DOWN THE MISSOURI 
COMPROMISE? 
VII.  WHY DO WE HATE DRED SCOTT? 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
How does one argue against the proposition that Dred Scott is the 
Court’s worst opinion?  No one today likes the opinion or the result.  Almost 
everyone agrees it is a bad opinion.  Chief Justice Taney’s “Opinion of the 
Court” contains racist language, bizarre legal analysis, and tendentious 
arguments.1  The narrow result—that Dred Scott was still a slave—seems so 
wrong and unfair, and violates all modern notions of justice.  Worse yet are 
Chief Justice Taney’s larger holdings—that the Constitution protected 
slavery, that Congress could not prohibit slavery in the territories, and that 
blacks, even if free, could never be citizens of the United States.  Popular 
historians or non-reflective legal scholars would like to claim it caused the 
Civil War.  Professor Farber is so incensed by the opinion that he would like 
to blame Chief Justice Taney for all the deaths in the Civil War—some 
 
 *   President William McKinley Distinguished Professor of Law and Public Policy, Albany 
Law School.  This article is a response to Daniel A. Farber’s A Fatal Loss of Balance: Dred Scott 
Revisited and part of Pepperdine Law Review’s April 1, 2011 Supreme Mistakes symposium, 
exploring the most maligned decisions in Supreme Court history.  Daniel A. Farber, A Fatal Loss of 
Balance: Dred Scott Revisited, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 13 (2011). 
 1.  See generally Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
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625,000—and then just for good measure raise the death total by nearly 
twenty five percent, to an astounding 800,000.2 
Professor Farber is of course a great advocate.  He makes his arguments, 
marshals his evidence to support his claim, exaggerates what the other side 
says, and charges forward.  I was astonished, for example, to learn from his 
paper that I am now one of those who want to “rehabilitate” Chief Justice 
Taney and his opinion.3  There is a huge difference between “rehabilitating” 
the opinion of the Chief Justice, and suggesting, as I did in a recent article,4 
that some aspects of the opinion were at least reasonable and that the 
outcome—that Scott remained a slave and could not sue in diversity—was 
probably legally correct. 
So let me start by making it clear, I have no love for the opinion or for 
Taney.  On this issue I can safely take an oath like those of the McCarthy 
era: I am not now, nor have I ever been a fan of Taney or the decision and I 
have never tried to rehabilitate either.  I stand foursquare with Senator 
Charles Sumner “that the name of Taney is to be hooted down the page of 
history.”5  Those scholars who like Taney the most—such as Carl Swisher6 
and Felix Frankfurter7—always wanted people to believe that Dred Scott 
was an aberration and that their Taney—the real Taney—was not such a bad 
fellow.  This is nonsense.  Chief Justice Taney was thoroughly racist and 
thoroughly pro-slavery.  For most of his adult life he opposed any rights for 
free blacks,8 and his jurisprudence almost always supported slavery.9  As 
President Andrew Jackson’s attorney general, Taney argued that blacks 
could never be citizens of the United States and thus were not entitled to 
passports and other rights of citizenship.10  He of course repeated these 
conclusions in Dred Scott.  Taney’s Dred Scott opinion was the apex of his 
 
 2.  Daniel A. Farber, A Fatal Loss of Balance: Dred Scott Revisited, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 13, 15 
(2011).  Farber uses this number in the penultimate paragraph of his introduction and also used it in 
his oral presentation at this symposium. 
 3.  See id. at 14. 
 4.  Paul Finkelman, Was Dred Scott Correctly Decided? An “Expert Report” for the Defendant, 
12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1219 (2008). 
 5.  Bust of Chief Justice Taney, CONG. GLOBE, 38TH CONG., 2D SESS. 1012 (1865), reprinted in 
PAUL FINKELMAN, DRED SCOTT V. SANDFORD: A BRIEF HISTORY WITH DOCUMENTS 221, 222 
(1997). 
 6.  See generally CARL BRENT SWISHER, ROGER B. TANEY (1935). 
 7.  See generally FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY, 
AND WAITE (1937); see also United States v. Int’l Union of United Auto., Aircraft, & Agric. 
Implement Workers of Am. (UAW-CIO), 352 U.S. 567, 590–91 (1957) (framing Dred Scott as one 
of “the rare occasions when the Court . . . has departed from its own practice”). 
 8.  But cf. Timothy S. Huebner, Roger B. Taney and the Slavery Issue: Looking Beyond—and 
Before—Dred Scott, 97 J. AM. HIST. 17 (2010) (arguing that early in his life Taney was not pro-
slavery or hostile to free blacks). 
 9.  See generally Paul Finkelman, Teaching Slavery in American Constitutional Law, 34 
AKRON L. REV. 261 (2000). 
 10.  SWISHER, supra note 6, at 154. 
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thought, not a wrong turn taken late in life.  During the Civil War Taney did 
everything in his power to undermine President Lincoln and the war effort.  
He was so opposed to black freedom that he started drafting an opinion on 
the unconstitutionality of the Emancipation Proclamation, even though no 
case on the issue was before him.  Taney was probably the staunchest ally 
the South had in Washington.  He never committed treason, as defined by 
the Constitution, only because his jurisprudence and his attempts to weaken 
Lincoln could not technically be considered “overt acts,”11 but his rulings 
surely gave great aid and comfort to the enemy,12 and had they been carried 
out would have severely undermined the war effort. 
But, when thinking about Dred Scott, the issue is not how do we 
“rehabilitate” the opinion.  The goal of scholarship here is to understand the 
opinion, place it in the context of its own time, and explain its enduring 
significance.  After that, we may praise or damn it, and rehabilitate it or 
condemn it. 
Farber argues that Dred Scott was illegitimately decided and that Taney 
overreached in his attempt to solve the problem of slavery in the territories 
in a single opinion.13  Tied to this we must also interrogate the claim implied 
by Farber, and made by others, that somehow Dred Scott caused the Civil 
War.  The answers to these questions will not be found in a law professor’s 
narrow analysis of the structure of the opinion. 
II.  THE LEGITIMACY OF THE TANEY OPINION AND THE DECISION-MAKING 
PROCESS 
Professor Farber attacks the legitimacy of the Dred Scott opinion on a 
number of levels.  He complains that Taney’s originalism is inappropriate, 
that the outcome is “predetermined” and thus the opinion is illegitimate, and 
that the decision is wrong—the worst in our history to fit with the theme of 
this symposium—in part because it is tainted by the outsider correspondence 
of James Buchanan.14  None of these critiques are very powerful in the end. 
 
 11.  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 1 (“Treason against the United States, shall consist only in 
levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort.  No 
Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt 
Act, or on Confession in open Court.”). 
 12.  See, e.g., Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9,487) (opinion issued 
as a Circuit Justice); see also The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 682–99 (1863) (Nelson, J., 
dissenting) (Chief Justice Taney joined this dissent). 
 13.  Farber, supra note 2, at 13. 
 14.  Id. at 20. 
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For a serious legal historian, the approach to Dred Scott cannot be an 
unsophisticated analysis, such as Professor Farber’s comment that 
comparing Taney’s originalism to the entire methodology of originalism is 
like trying to understand vegetarianism by noting that Hitler practiced it.15  
Such arguments may score points in a public talk, but they entirely miss the 
point of scholarly analysis.  Hitler’s eating practices had nothing to do with 
either the theory of vegetarianism or the politics of his regime.16  
Originalism, however, was very much a part of the jurisprudence—and the 
pro-slavery jurisprudence—of nineteenth century jurists like Taney and 
Joseph Story.  Both vigorously applied a jurisprudence of originalism to 
bolster slavery.  In Prigg v. Pennsylvania Justice Story argued that the 
Fugitive Slave Clause was a fundamental compromise at the Constitutional 
Convention and that without it the Constitution would never have been 
accepted by the delegates or ratified.17  The history of the Convention shows 
that this is utterly incorrect,18 and in fact it contradicts Story’s earlier 
assertions in his magisterial Commentaries on the Constitution of the United 
States19 that the clause was a minor part of the convention and a “gift” the 
northern delegates gave the Southerners.20  Story may not have been a very 
good historian, but that is true of almost every Justice who has ever used an 
originalist approach.21  In Dred Scott Taney may in fact have been a far 
better originalist than Story was in Prigg or than most modern Justices are 
today.  His research into colonial and early national law is impressive, 
especially when we remember that it was done without modern libraries 
(much less electronic searching) and also without law clerks.  He applied his 
historical analysis with vigor—perhaps a little too much vigor—but also 
with some sophistication.  Despite Farber’s comments, Dred Scott is in fact 
 
 15.  Id. at 45. 
 16.  One might of course argue that the analogy that Farber dismisses may be useful in showing 
that it is possible to be a vegetarian (and presumably respect the lives of animals) while at the same 
time condoning harming human beings.  Thus, the hypocrisy of Hitler’s vegetarianism while 
creating a regime that perpetrated mass murder and wholesale extermination of people might carry 
over to modern animal rights extremists who commit acts of terrorism against scientists by blowing 
up cars or firebombing homes and research facilities, while claiming they respect the lives of 
animals, or anti-choice terrorists, who claim to be “pro-life” while murdering doctors and nurses and 
planting bombs that indiscriminately kill bystanders.  On violent animal rights activists see Ashmore 
v. Regents of the University of California (Case No.: 2:10-CV-09050) (this case is currently pending 
in the Central District of California). 
 17.  Prigg v. Pennsylania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 540 (1842). 
 18.  See Paul Finkelman, Story Telling on the Supreme Court: Prigg v. Pennsylvania and Justice 
Joseph Story’s Judicial Nationalism, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 247, 259–63. 
 19.  JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 676–77 (Da 
Capo Press, reprint 1970) (1833). 
 20.  See Finkelman, supra note 18, at 264. 
 21.  Paul Finkelman, The Constitution and the Intentions of the Framers: The Limits of 
Historical Analysis, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 349 (1989). 
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a clear example of originalism in action, and his methodology is not nearly 
as unsophisticated as Farber would like it to be. 
Taney argues from an originalist perspective that slavery is protected by 
the Constitution, at least in part because the nation was founded by 
slaveholders who were intent on protecting their most important economic 
and social interest.  Similarly, he argues that blacks could not be citizens of 
the United States because at the Founding they were universally treated as 
politically powerless, degraded persons, who were “so far inferior, that they 
had no rights which the white man was bound to respect.”22  These 
arguments are not inconsistent with a sophisticated approach to originalism.  
We may not like Taney’s conclusions and we may cringe at the deep racism 
of his rhetoric.  We can condemn him for this unnecessarily cruel and 
offensive language.  But that does not mean his originalism is totally off the 
mark.  On the contrary, many serious historians have demonstrated that 
slavery was a central issue of the American Founding and that the 
Constitutional Convention bent over backwards to protect slavery in a 
number of ways.23  Moreover, in Taney’s own time many sophisticated 
highly educated abolitionists, such as Wendell Phillips and William Lloyd 
Garrison, read the history of the Founding and the original intent of the 
Framers exactly the same way that Taney did.  Garrison and Phillips 
advocated that Northerners secede from the pro-slavery Union precisely 
because the Constitution protected slavery and oppressed blacks. 
It makes no sense to complain, as Farber does, that Taney’s opinion 
“suggests, if nothing else, a determination to reach a predetermined 
conclusion at any price.”24  After all, isn’t this true for virtually every 
opinion that every judge writes?  Does Professor Farber believe, or did the 
late David Currie whom he quoted believe, that when a Justice sits down to 
write an opinion he or she does not know where the opinion will lead, or 
what the holding will be?  When Chief Justice John Marshall sat down to 
 
 22.  Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407 (1857). 
 23.  See generally DAVID BRION DAVIS, THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY IN THE AGE OF 
REVOLUTION, 1770–1823 (1975); PAUL FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION: SLAVERY, 
FEDERALISM, AND COMITY (1981) [hereinafter FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION]; PAUL 
FINKELMAN, SLAVERY AND THE FOUNDERS: RACE AND LIBERTY IN THE AGE OF JEFFERSON (2d ed. 
2001); DONALD L. ROBINSON, SLAVERY IN THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN POLITICS, 1765–1820 
(1971); GEORGE WILLIAM VAN CLEVE, A SLAVEHOLDERS’ UNION: SLAVERY, POLITICS, AND THE 
CONSTITUTION IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC (2010); DAVID WALDSTREICHER, SLAVERY’S 
CONSTITUTION: FROM REVOLUTION TO RATIFICATION  (2010); WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE SOURCES 
OF ANTISLAVERY CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA, 1760–1848 (1977). 
 24.  Farber, supra note 2, at 14 (quoting DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME 
COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS, 1789–1888, at 263–72 (1985)). 
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write Marbury25 was he involved in an inner debate with himself over how 
the case would come out?  When Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote Brown26 
did he wonder if he would uphold segregation, and only as he wrote the 
opinion did he convince himself otherwise?  Surely no one believes such 
things.  Does Professor Farber think that constitutional law decisions are the 
result of the Justice looking into the sky for the brooding omnipresence of 
the law,27 and then pulling down the right decisions to match the facts of the 
case?  I doubt it. 
In trying to understand the importance of Dred Scott, it makes no sense 
to attack the opinion merely because a famous citizen, who held no political 
office at the time, communicated directly with members of the Court and 
lobbied one Justice on how to vote.  Farber condemns James Buchanan for 
his letters to Justices Catron and Grier before the decision of the Court was 
announced.  He says it “represents perhaps the greatest example of 
Executive intrusion into the Court’s deliberations in U.S. history.”28  He 
asserts it is “an extraordinary case of presidential intrusion into the judicial 
process. . . .”29  Whether this is true or not is unclear.  At the outset, it is 
worth noting that at the time of this “intervention” Buchanan was in fact not 
the nation’s chief executive, but only the President-elect.  Thus, it is not 
technically an “executive intrusion.”  But, this minor point of chronology 
aside, we might ask, how did Buchanan’s correspondence with Justices John 
Catron and Robert Grier actually affect the case? 
As Farber notes, in late January Buchanan contacted his old friend, the 
Jacksonian Democrat from Tennessee, Justice John Catron, to find out when 
the decision would be announced.30  Buchanan was writing his inaugural 
address—to be given in March—and he wanted to know what to say about 
the pressing issue of slavery in the territories.  Buchanan wanted to know if 
the decision would be announced before his March inauguration so he could 
comment on the case.31  This was a political ploy that in the end backfired, 
because by endorsing the opinion before it was announced, Buchanan only 
opened himself up to criticism of colluding with Chief Justice Taney.  But, 
Buchanan’s political maneuverings, and how they affected the politics of the 
late 1850s, cannot be used as a reason for supporting or condemning Taney’s 
opinion in Dred Scott. 
 
 25.  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 26.  Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 27.  As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. wrote “[t]he common law is not a brooding 
omnipresence in the sky but the articulate voice of some sovereign or quasi-sovereign that can be 
identified.”  S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 28.  Farber, supra note 2, at 39. 
 29.  Id. at 15. 
 30.  Id. at 40. 
 31.  See DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW 
AND POLITICS 307, 311–12 (1978) (discussing the Buchanan correspondence). 
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We can condemn Buchanan for the impropriety of asking what the 
outcome would be.  But, his asking surely did not delegitimize the decision, 
or even affect the decision.  It could only affect his administration.  
Surprisingly, Catron replied to Buchanan, which was of course a violation of 
judicial ethics, although not perhaps as great a violation then as it is today.  
More surprisingly, Catron asked Buchanan to discuss the case with another 
member of the Court, Justice Robert Grier.32  Like Buchanan, Grier was a 
Pennsylvania Democrat.  At this point in the court’s deliberations, Taney 
was going to write the “Opinion of the Court” and the other four Southerners 
on the Court had agreed to endorse it, although in the end each would write 
his own concurring opinion.  Two Northerners, John McLean and Benjamin 
R. Curtis, were going to dissent.  Justice Samuel Nelson of New York was 
planning to write an opinion concurring in the result—that Dred Scott was 
still a slave—but either rejecting or ignoring all of Taney’s holdings on 
black citizenship, the constitutionality of the Missouri Compromise, and the 
power of Congress to regulate slavery in the territories. 
Catron was concerned that no Northerners were willing to sign on to 
Taney’s opinion.  Thus, he asked Buchanan to try to persuade Grier to join 
Taney’s opinion.  Thus, the “executive intrusion” that Farber condemns did 
not emanate from the “executive” (or actually the executive-elect).  Nor did 
it come from Chief Justice Taney.  Rather, it came from the staunch Unionist 
Catron.33   
Justice Catron’s tactics and James Buchanan’s willingness to participate 
in those tactics may seem unethical today, but this sort of behavior was not 
clearly unethical at the time.  Indeed, recent scholarship suggests that contact 
between Justices and politicians, lawyers, litigants, and members of the 
public were not uncommon at this time.34  In 1846, Justice McLean 
discussed a pending case with Salmon P. Chase, who was an attorney in the 
case.35  In 1853, Justice Curtis discussed ongoing litigation involving foreign 
affairs with the Secretary of State.36  In 1856, Justice Nelson told a lawyer he 
 
 32.  Id. at 311. 
 33.  See the correspondence between Catron and Buchanan in Philip Auchampaugh, James 
Buchanan, the Court and the Dred Scott Case, TENNESSEE HISTORICAL MAGAZINE, Jan. 1926, at 
231 (including letters from Catron to Buchanan on February 6, 1857, February 10, 1857, and 
February 23, 1857, as well as letters from Buchanan); see also 10 THE WORKS OF JAMES 
BUCHANAN: COMPRISING HIS SPEECHES, STATE PAPERS, AND PRIVATE CORRESPONDENCE 105–13 
(John Bassett Moore ed., 1910). 
 34.  Rachel A. Shelden, The Taney Court and the Problem of Judicial Ethics in the Nineteenth 
Century 2 (Nov. 2011) (unpublished paper presented at the American Society for Legal History 
Annual Meeting, Atlanta, GA) (on file with the Pepperdine Law Review). 
 35.  Id. at 4. 
 36.  Id. 
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had won his case before the Court announced its decision.37  And while 
Grier and Catron were talking to Buchanan about the Dred Scott case, Curtis 
was telling his correspondents about the Court’s deliberations.  Prominent 
advocates before the Court—such as John Y. Mason, William H. Seward, 
Reverdy Johnson, and Edwin Stanton—often socialized with members of the 
Court and discussed pending litigation.38  Buchanan’s correspondence was 
clearly within the realm of common practice at the time, although his pre-
endorsement of the outcome in his inaugural address stepped over the line of 
normal behavior. 
Nor can this appearance of impropriety, as Farber puts it, really be an 
argument against the logic of the decision.  Surely it cannot be considered 
unethical for a citizen to weigh in with a Justice on how a case should be 
decided.  Citizens have that right; it is the Justices who are supposed to 
maintain a sense of judicial propriety and ignore what outsiders say.  But, we 
know that is not always the case.  Was there “impropriety” in the summer of 
1919 when Professor Zachariah Chafee lobbied Justice Holmes on the 
meaning of free speech39 after his anti-libertarian decision in Schenck v. 
United States?40  Chafee’s lobbying led Holmes to substantially revise the 
“clear and present danger” doctrine just eight months later in Abrams v. 
United States.41  Is Holmes’s brilliant and highly regarded Abrams dissent 
less impressive and somehow tainted because a famous law professor 
lobbied him to change his jurisprudence?  After the Court’s outrageously 
oppressive opinion in Minersville School District v. Gobitis,42 numerous law 
professors wrote scathing articles condemning the case, and just three years 
later Justices William O. Douglas and Hugo Black reversed themselves,43 in 
part because of the “pressure” of academic criticism.  Was this improper, 
and is Justice Robert Jackson’s brilliant opinion in West Virginia Board of 
Education v. Barnette, overturning Gobitis, somehow tainted by this 
history?  Is the logic of the Second Legal Tender case44 suspect because 
President Grant purposefully appointed Joseph Bradley and William Strong 
to the bench because Grant knew they would reverse the First Legal Tender 
 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  Id. at 9–12. 
 39.  See Fred D. Ragan, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Zechariah Chafee, Jr., and the 
Clear and Present Danger Test for Free Speech: The First Year, 1919, 58 J. AM. HIST. 24, 26–27 
(1971). 
 40.  Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). 
 41.  Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919).  For a history of this case see RICHARD 
POLENBERG, FIGHTING FAITHS: THE ABRAMS CASE, THE SUPREME COURT, AND FREE SPEECH 
(1987). 
 42.  Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), overruled by W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. 
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
 43.  See W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
 44.  Knox v. Lee, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1871) (the Second Legal Tender case). 
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case,45 and uphold the Legal Tender Act?  Charles Evans Hughes, who had 
been on the Court and would later return as Chief Justice, thought the 
decision was one of the Court’s “self-inflicted wounds”46  because the Court 
reversed itself within a year of the first decision.  But, however much this 
undermined the credibility of the Court, even Hughes did not believe the 
final decision—upholding the use of paper currency during the Civil War— 
was incorrect.47 
The answer to all of these questions is of course a resounding no.  So 
similarly, we cannot attack the substance of the decision merely because 
President-elect Buchanan corresponded with Justices Grier and Catron.  It is 
further worth noting that Buchanan’s correspondence had virtually no effect 
on the outcome of the case.  As I have just noted, Grier already agreed with 
the result—that Dred Scott would remain a slave—before Buchanan wrote 
to him.  Grier was simply planning to sign on to the concurring opinion of 
Justice Samuel Nelson, a New Yorker, who also concluded that Dred Scott 
would remain a slave.  Catron, who was from Tennessee, wanted Grier to 
sign on to Taney’s opinion which already had a five vote majority, so that it 
would have at least one Northerner supporting it.  This maneuvering, and 
Buchanan’s participation in it, had no effect on Taney’s Opinion of the 
Court or on Dred Scott’s fate.  Finally, we should remember that Grier’s 
concurring opinion was pretty much meaningless, announcing in one 
sentence that he agreed with Justice Nelson’s concurrence and in a short 
paragraph concurring with Chief Justice Taney,48 even though in fact, 
Nelson and Taney disagreed on the fundamental question of how to decide 
the case. 
After the decision was announced, Republicans, such as Abraham 
Lincoln and William Henry Seward, alleged that the decision was part of a 
conspiracy between, among others, Taney and Buchanan, and that before 
Buchanan gave his inaugural address Taney told him what the opinion, then 
still unannounced, would contain.  The Buchanan-Catron-Grier 
correspondence shows that Lincoln and Seward were correct in alleging that 
Buchanan knew the result before it was announced, even if they were wrong 
about Taney being the Justice who compromised the Court’s integrity and 
secrecy.  Had the Republicans known about these letters, as scholars do 
 
 45.  Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603 (1870) (the First Legal Tender case). 
 46.  CHARLES EVANS HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: ITS FOUNDATION, 
METHODS, AND ACHIEVEMENTS; AN INTERPRETATION 50–52 (Garden City Publ’g Co. 1936) 
(1928).  He also stated that Dred Scott was one of these cases.  Id. at 50. 
 47.  See id. at 51–52. 
 48.  Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 469 (1857) (Grier, J., concurring). 
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today, they would have been useful campaign tools in 1858 and 1860, but it 
is unlikely that they would have substantially changed the nation’s politics. 
Farber also makes an argument that Taney was somehow playing 
politics to support Buchanan in his intra-party conflict with Stephen A. 
Douglas over the Lecompton constitution in Kansas.49  The only problem 
with this analysis is that the Lecompton constitution was not written until 
September 1857, which was six months after the Dred Scott decision was 
announced.50  Moreover, the controversy over the Lecompton constitution 
did not emerge until the fall of 1857, well after Buchanan was in office.51  
Buchanan and Douglas were rivals in 1856, but the break between them did 
not come until early December 1857, when Douglas “stormed into the White 
House to confront Buchanan on the ‘trickery and juggling’ of this 
Lecompton constitution.”52  Indeed, at late as October, the governor of the 
Kansas Territory, Robert J. Walker, believed that Buchanan would not 
support the Lecompton constitution because it was “a vile fraud, a bare 
counterfeit.”53  The break between Douglas and Buchanan, in late 1857 and 
early 1858, was over the Senator’s opposition to Lecompton because it was 
“fraudulent.”54  Douglas opposed the Lecompton constitution not because it 
supported slavery—Douglas repeatedly asserted that he did not care if 
slavery was voted up or down—but because the fraud and rigged elections 
attached to it made a mockery of popular sovereignty.  None of these issues 
had anything to do with Taney’s opinion in Dred Scott.55 
Thus, Taney’s opinion cannot be seen as the Chief Justice siding with 
one Democrat—Buchanan—in an intraparty dispute with another 
Democrat—Douglas—because in March 1857, the dispute did not exist.  
Douglas, like Buchanan, accepted the legitimacy of Taney’s major point—
that Congress could not ban slavery in the territories.  That was the essence 
of Douglas’s position that the issue of slavery in the territories should be 
decided by popular sovereignty.  Other than the fraud tied to the Lecompton 
constitution, the only dispute between Buchanan and Douglas was when 
popular sovereignty could constitutionally take effect.  Douglas wanted the 
territorial legislatures to decide the issue, while Taney agreed with Buchanan 
that a ban on slavery could only happen at the time of statehood.56  Farber 
 
 49.  Farber, supra note 2, at 41. 
 50.  See FRANCIS H. HELLER, THE KANSAS STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 2 
(1992). 
 51.  See JAMES M. MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR ERA 165–69 
(1988). 
 52.  Id. at 166. 
 53.  Id. at 165. 
 54.  Id. at 166. 
 55.  See id. at 162–69. 
 56.  James Buchanan, Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1857), in 10 THE WORKS OF JAMES 
BUCHANAN: COMPRISING HIS SPEECHES, STATE PAPERS, AND PRIVATE CORRESPONDENCE 105–06 
(John Bassett Moore ed., 1910). 
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says this means Taney was siding with Buchanan against Douglas.  But, had 
Taney reached the opposite conclusion—that the territorial legislature could 
ban slavery through popular sovereignty—then Farber or someone else 
would argue that Taney was impermissibly siding with Douglas against 
Buchanan.  Whatever Taney said would have supported one set of political 
players or another.  But this does not prove that Taney reached the 
conclusions he did because he favored one faction among the Democrats 
rather than the other. 
Thus, when we look at Farber’s arguments about the illegitimacy of the 
decision, they turn out to be not very impressive.  Originalism was not an 
unheard of interpretive tool, and Taney’s massive historical analysis of the 
rights of blacks at the Founding was an impressive marshaling of evidence.  
We might disagree with Taney’s conclusions.  As an historian I would argue 
he should have been more nuanced in his use of history.  But, neither his 
analysis nor his conclusions that most of the Founders did not contemplate 
black citizenship were embarrassing or obviously wrong.  Clearly most of 
the Southerners at the Convention did not imagine blacks serving in 
Congress, arguing cases before the Supreme Court, becoming officers in the 
Army, or serving on federal juries.  The earliest Congresses, in which a 
significant number of Founders served, banned blacks from serving in 
militia in the Militia Act of 179257 and banned them from becoming citizens 
in the first Naturalization Act.58  This illustrates that a majority of political 
leaders of the Founding generation did not see blacks as citizens, even 
though free blacks voted on the same basis as whites in about half the states 
when the Constitution was ratified.59  Taney’s argument that the Constitution 
protected slavery was not novel, and it was not incorrect.  As for Buchanan’s 
correspondence with Catron and Grier, it had no meaningful effect on the 
outcome of the case, although it did taint Buchanan’s own inaugural address.  
But, that is an issue of politics, not jurisprudence. 
III.  DID DRED SCOTT CAUSE THE CIVIL WAR? 
The idea that a Supreme Court decision caused the Civil War seems 
patently silly.  The Civil War resulted from secession.  And Dred Scott was 
 
 57.  Militia Act of 1792, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 271 (1792). 
 58.  Naturalization Act of 1790, ch. 3, § 1, 1 Stat. 103 (1790).  See also Stephen A. Siegel, The 
Federal Government’s Power to Enact Color-Conscious Laws: An Originialist Inquiry, 92 NW. U. 
L. REV. 477, 521–22 (1998) (discussing Congress’s first Naturalization Act). 
 59.  In 1787 free blacks could vote in Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, New Jersey, 
Pennsylvania, and North Carolina.  See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 573–74 
(1857) (Curtis, J., dissenting); Hobbs v. Fogg, 6 Watts 553, 560 (Pa. 1837). 
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surely not the cause of secession.  Secessionists and southern nationalists60 
loved the decision.  There is not, as far as I can tell, a single complaint about 
Dred Scott in any of the southern declarations explaining secession.  Had the 
North seceded, we could argue that Dred Scott was a factor, since it was so 
unpopular in the North.  But, no Southerners were pushed out of the Union 
by Dred Scott, which they loved. 
The southern states claimed they were leaving the Union because they 
had been denied meaningful access to the federal territories.  The southern 
states made these arguments despite the Court’s decision opening all of the 
federal territories to slavery and the Court’s emphatic assertion that 
Southerners had a constitutional right to take slaves into the territories.61  
The seceding states argued that Northerners had effectively prevented them 
from enjoying the rights Dred Scott gave them.  Whether these assertions are 
true or not is irrelevant; clearly southern leaders believed them to be true, or 
at least believed that these claims were rhetorically useful to gain popular 
support for secession.  Furthermore, in their secession documents the 
southern states point to the fact that Republicans and Lincoln had promised 
to prevent the spread of slavery into the territories.  In other words, Dred 
Scott did not cause secession; rather, it was the Republican refusal to accept 
the legitimacy of Dred Scott that helped lead to secession.  Southerners left 
the Union not because they disliked Taney’s decision, but because a 
majority of Northerners refused to accept it.  This is not the fault of Taney or 
the Court. 
A number of seceding states also complained that their citizens could 
not travel into the North with their slaves.  Southerners argued that the 
Northern states were unconstitutionally denying their rights as U.S. citizens 
under the Commerce Clause,62 the Full Faith and Credit Clause,63 and the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause.64  These complaints were based on cases 
and statutes across the North which led to freedom for any slave voluntarily 
brought into a free state by his or her master.65  The decision in Dred Scott 
gave Southerners two reasons to hope that the Court would soon side with 
them on this issue. 
Scott’s master—the army physician Captain John Emerson—had taken 
him to the free state of Illinois.66  Had Scott sued for freedom in Illinois he 
might have won his liberty in the state court.  Similarly, he might have won 
his liberty in a court in the Wisconsin Territory when Dr. Emerson was 
 
 60.  This is a term used for Southerners who wanted to create a separate southern nation, and not 
for Southerners who were “nationalists” in favor retaining a unified United States. 
 61.  Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 451–52. 
 62.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 63.  U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
 64.  U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1. 
 65.  See generally FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION, supra note 23. 
 66.  Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 397. 
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stationed at Fort Snelling.  However, he failed to make a claim in either 
place, and did not assert his right to freedom based on residence in a free 
jurisdiction until he had been taken back to Missouri.  The trial court in 
Missouri upheld his claim to freedom in 1850, based on state precedents 
dating from just after Missouri became a state.67  However, two years later, 
in a blatantly political decision, the Missouri Supreme Court reversed the 
trial court in Dred Scott’s case, rejected its older precedents, and declared 
that it would no longer emancipate slaves who had lived in free 
jurisdictions.68  When Scott was transferred to the late Dr. Emerson’s 
brother-in-law, John F.A. Sanford,69 Scott was able to revive his case in 
federal court, because Sanford lived in New York.  Thus, Scott sued in 
diversity, claiming he was a free citizen of Missouri, being illegally deprived 
of his liberty by a citizen of New York.70 
Assuming that the Court had jurisdiction in this case, and that Scott 
could sue in diversity,71 a different Supreme Court could have legitimately 
held that Scott gained his freedom when Dr. Emerson took him to Illinois, 
and that once free he was always free.  A different set of Justices might have 
asserted that Scott had an equitable claim to freedom because he had in fact 
been free since the early 1830s, and that the Supreme Court had the power 
and the obligation to enforce this claim.  Except for the issue of jurisdiction, 
this would have been a plausible and constitutionally legitimate outcome to 
the case.  But, the Taney Court took the opposite view, on two separate 
grounds.  Taney and five of his brethren believed that Scott could not sue in 
diversity and thus there was no jurisdiction to hear the case.72  Justice 
 
 67.  See Winny v. Whitesides, 1 Mo. 472 (1824) (holding that a slaveholder lost her right to her 
slave by residing in Illinois).  This case is discussed in FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION, supra 
note 23, at 217–23. 
 68.  Scott v. Emerson, 15 Mo. 576 (1852).  This case is discussed in FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT 
UNION, supra note 23, at 222–28. 
 69.  The case name is Dred Scott v. Sandford because the Supreme Court clerk misspelled the 
defendant’s name.  The defendant, John F.A. Sanford, actually spelled his name with only one “d” 
and not two.  FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE, supra note 31, at 2. 
 70.  Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 400. 
 71.  It seems clear that free blacks were never “citizens” of Missouri before the Civil War, and 
thus, Scott’s claim of diversity jurisdiction was problematic.  I have argued elsewhere that it is 
impossible to argue that, even if free, Scott was a citizen of Missouri.  See Finkelman, supra note 4, 
at 1219–52. 
 72.  The vote count here is complicated.  The four Associate Justices from the South (Wayne, 
Daniel, Campbell, and Catron) all explicitly endorsed Taney’s conclusions on black citizenship.  See 
Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 454–56 (Wayne, J., concurring); id. at 469–93 (Daniel, J., 
concurring); id. at 493–518 (Campbell, J., concurring); id. at 518–29 (Catron, J., concurring).  
Nelson (of New York) denied the Court had jurisdiction on other grounds, and thus concurred with 
Taney on the outcome of the case—that Dred Scott was still a slave—but not on black citizenship or 
congressional power over the territories.  See id. at 457–69 (Nelson, J., separate opinion).  Grier (of 
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Nelson, with Grier concurring, ignored the jurisdictional question on black 
citizenship, and simply held that under the existing precedent of Strader v. 
Graham,73 the Supreme Court could not question Missouri’s determination 
of Scott’s status.74  Through either theory, Southerners gained a huge 
jurisprudential victory. 
The Taney position meant that no black—slave or free—could ever sue 
in a federal court in diversity, and that except for a small number of cases 
coming out of the District of Columbia, the territories, or admiralty 
jurisdiction, it would be impossible for a black to ever assert a freedom 
claim in a federal court.  Under Taney’s opinion there would be no more 
freedom suits by people like Dred Scott brought into a federal court. 
Justice Samuel Nelson’s opinion was helpful to the South in two other 
ways.  By relying on the earlier holding in Strader, Nelson and Grier 
reaffirmed that the Supreme Court would not force the slave states to give 
full faith and credit to free-state decisions, statutes, and constitutional 
provisions emancipating visiting slaves.  This was a big victory for 
Southerners. 
Equally helpful to the South was the last paragraph of Justice Nelson’s 
concurring opinion.75  Nelson was from New York, which since 1841 had 
taken a very firm position of emancipating any slave brought within its 
borders.76  Nelson was surely aware of the Lemmon case,77 then making its 
way through the New York courts.78  That case involved Jonathan and Juliet 
Lemmon, who in 1852 were moving from Virginia to Texas.79  The best 
route was to take a steamboat to New York City, spend three nights there, 
and then take another boat that would travel directly to New Orleans.80  
Indeed, this was the only way to sail directly from the east coast to New 
Orleans.  In New York City the Lemmons were hauled into court for locking 
up their slaves, which the trial court referred to as eight “colored persons.”81  
The eight slaves were then freed and quickly went north to become colored 
Canadians.82  An appeal to New York’s intermediate court was pending 
 
Pennsylvania) explicitly concurred with both Nelson and Taney, which was logically impossible, so 
presumably he agreed with Taney on the citizenship question.  See id. at 469 (Grier, J., concurring). 
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 74.  Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 452–54 (Nelson, J., separate opinion) (discussing Strader). 
 75.  Id. at 468–69. 
 76.  See FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION, supra note 23, at 131–36. 
 77.  Lemmon v. People, 20 N.Y. 562 (1860). 
 78.  See FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION, supra note 23, at 296–97. 
 79.  Lemmon, 20 N.Y. at 566. 
 80.  See FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION, supra note 23, at 296–97. 
 81.  People ex rel. Napoleon v. Lemmon, 7 N.Y. Super. Ct. (5 Sand.) 681, 706 (1852).  See also 
FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION, supra note 23, at 297. 
 82.  FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION, supra note 23, at 297. 
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when Dred Scott was decided.83  Everyone involved assumed the case would 
eventually reach the U.S. Supreme Court and test the right of the free states 
to emancipate slaves in transit.  In their secession documents a number of 
states mentioned this issue as a reason for secession.84  But, the complaints 
of the secessionists on this issue were not a result of Dred Scott.  Indeed, at 
the end of his opinion, Justice Nelson strongly implied that when the 
Lemmon case or some similar case reached the Court, the Justices would 
support the slave owners.  Thus, Nelson wrote: 
 A question has been alluded to, on the argument, namely: the 
right of the master with his slave of transit into or through a free 
State, on business or commercial pursuits, or in the exercise of a 
Federal right, or the discharge of a Federal duty, being a citizen of 
the United States, which is not before us.  This question depends 
upon different considerations and principles from the one in hand, 
and turns upon the rights and privileges secured to a common 
citizen of the republic under the Constitution of the United States.  
When that question arises, we shall be prepared to decide it.85 
This analysis makes clear that Dred Scott had absolutely nothing to do 
with secession, unless one makes the argument that Dred Scott caused 
secession because without it Lincoln would have never become a nationally 
known candidate and thus been elected president.  It is true that Lincoln rose 
to prominence attacking the decision, but that hardly makes Taney’s 
decision among the worst in our jurisprudence. 
IV.  WAS THE CASE WRONGLY DECIDED? 
Professor White argues that one measure of a “Supreme Mistake” is that 
the outcome is “pernicious.”86  In every other case discussed in this 
symposium the “prosecutor” argues that the final holding of the case—the 
outcome—was wrong and should have come out the other way.  But, this is 
not truly the case here.  It is hard to argue that Dred Scott was wrongly 
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decided.  As I will sketch out below, it is truly difficult to determine how the 
Court could have reached any other conclusion.  Even Professor Farber 
admits that the outcome—that Dred Scott remained a slave—is not 
particularly outrageous.87  Farber seems to be simply arguing that the Court 
should have reached this result on other grounds.  In hindsight it is clear that 
that would have been the most prudent way to act.  But, as I will outline 
below, Chief Justice Taney and his brethren believed that Taney’s sweeping 
opinion would not only be accepted by most Americans, but that it was a 
judicious and economical way of ending the divisive debate over slavery in 
the territories. 
Initially the Court was going to decide the case on very narrow grounds, 
based on Strader v. Graham.88  Strader was a suit between a slave owner 
(Graham) and the owner of a steamboat (Strader).89  The steamboat had 
taken three of Graham’s slaves to Ohio, and they then escaped to Canada.90  
Graham sued under a Kentucky law for the value of the lost slaves, and the 
appeals of this case first reached Kentucky’s highest court in 1844.91  Strader 
argued that the slaves had previously been allowed to go to Indiana and Ohio 
where they worked as musicians, and thus they were free.92  If this were true, 
then Strader had not harmed Graham because the three blacks were not 
actually his slaves.  The Kentucky Court of Appeals held that the status of 
the three slaves was not at issue, and that even if they had been allowed to 
visit the North, they remained slaves when they returned to Kentucky.93  If 
the slaves themselves had sued in Kentucky they might have won, because, 
since 1820,94 Kentucky courts had been freeing slaves who had lived or 
worked in the free states.95  But, in Strader the Kentucky court was not 
willing to rule on their freedom while they were not before the courts, and 
thus Strader was held liable for the value of Graham’s slaves.96 
Strader appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court where he again lost.  In 
Strader v. Graham the Court effectively held that the states were free to 
decide the status of all people before their courts.97  Since the Kentucky 
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court decided that the three blacks were slaves, the Supreme Court could not 
intervene.98  The facts of Strader were very similar to those in Dred Scott.  
Like Graham’s slaves, Scott had lived in two free jurisdictions—Illinois and 
the Wisconsin Territory (present-day Minnesota)—and he might have 
sought his freedom in either place.  Instead, he returned to Missouri where 
the state court held him to be a slave.  Thus, the Supreme Court initially 
planned to simply affirm Scott’s status, based on Missouri law and the 
precedent in Strader.  Had the Court done this almost no one would 
remember the case, and it would certainly not be considered one of the 
Court’s worst decisions.  The Supreme Court in Strader simply allowed the 
states to decide the status of people living in their states.  Had the Court 
followed Strader, as the Justices initially planned, the Dred Scott outcome 
would have been exactly the same as Taney’s Strader opinion.  This was the 
position of Justice Samuel Nelson’s separate opinion.99 
Almost every scholar, including Farber, agrees that Nelson’s opinion 
was legally and constitutionally legitimate and even correct.  Even the 
Republican critics of the opinion had no great problems with the part of 
Nelson’s opinion which held Scott was a slave.  Thus, we have the oddity 
that Professor Farber would like to make Dred Scott into a “Supreme 
Mistake” while admitting that the outcome is probably correct, or that it was 
at least not unreasonable, and that under the laws and jurisprudence of the 
time, that outcome was neither pernicious nor outside the realm of 
constitutional legitimacy.  I cannot imagine how a case can be a “Supreme 
Mistake” if it ends with a correct result. 
If Dred Scott was wrong—a “Supreme Mistake”—it cannot be because 
of the narrow result.  It must be because Chief Justice Taney’s reasoning 
was supremely wrong, or because, as Farber argues, his opinion was 
overreaching.  The issues here are about Taney’s jurisdictional arguments—
his arguments about the territories, his arguments about race, and most of all, 
his assertions that the Constitution was pro-slavery. 
V.  WAS THE JURISDICTIONAL ISSUE CORRECTLY DECIDED? 
Modern Americans are probably most offended by Taney’s argument 
that Dred Scott had no standing to sue because blacks could not be citizens 
of the United States.  This is a complicated question, and one in which 
Taney probably overstated the case.  Taney argued that at the Founding 
 
 98.  See FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION, supra note 23, at 272. 
 99.  See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 456–69 (1857) (Nelson, J., separate 
opinion). 
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almost all blacks in America were slaves, that those few who were free were 
treated as second-class persons, and that they had “no rights” that whites 
needed to respect.100  However, as Justices John McLean and Benjamin R. 
Curtis noted in dissent, free blacks were allowed to vote in some states at the 
Founding, and thus were presumably citizens of those states.101  Since 
federal citizenship derived from state citizenship under the Constitution, 
then some blacks, however few, must have been citizens of the United States 
at the Founding.  Taney would have been on much stronger ground in 
asserting that in 1857 (at the time he was writing this opinion) that in some 
of the Northern states and all of the Southern, free blacks were not citizens 
of the United States because they were not citizens of the states in which 
they lived.  This was certainly true in Missouri, where free blacks had almost 
no rights and many disabilities, and thus were surely not citizens.  Thus, 
Taney’s assertion that blacks could never be citizens of the United States is 
an example of overreaching—although it does not affect the outcome of the 
case or Dred Scott’s status. 
However, it is also abundantly clear that Taney was correct that no 
blacks were fully equal to whites at the Founding.102  Even where blacks 
could vote, they were not equal.  They were often barred from public 
schools, the state monitored their movements, and they were even forced to 
carry identification showing that they were free.  Even in Massachusetts, 
where blacks could vote on the same basis as white men, there were curfews 
for free blacks, they were excluded from public schools, excluded from all 
the state’s colleges, could not marry whites, and faced some differential 
punishments.  Even where blacks voted, it was clear that they only had those 
rights which the white majority granted them.  After 1800, New Jersey, 
Pennsylvania, North Carolina, and Tennessee completely disfranchised 
blacks, while New York provided special requirements for black voters that 
white voters did not have to meet.103  Taney may have exaggerated the 
disabilities of free blacks at the Founding, and surely some blacks were 
citizens of their states (and thus of the nation), but he did not overstate the 
case for the vast majority of free blacks in the nation.  As the refusal to 
enfranchise blacks in a number of states at the Founding and the later 
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disfranchisement of blacks show, Taney would have been on stronger 
ground in simply asserting that for most of the nation—and for the 
overwhelming majority of blacks who were in fact slaves—during and after 
the Founding almost all blacks in the new nation were “so far inferior, that 
they had no rights which the white man was bound to respect.”104 
Taney was also clearly correct about Dred Scott’s citizenship.  Scott 
sued in diversity.105  That is, he sued in federal court on the theory that he 
was a citizen of the state of Missouri and that the defendant, John F. A. 
Sanford, was a citizen of New York.106  Clearly, however, Dred Scott was 
emphatically not a citizen of Missouri, even if he was legally free.  Free 
blacks in Missouri—and in all of the other fourteen slave states—were not 
citizens of those states.107  At every turn they were restricted—not merely on 
the right to vote or hold office.  Free blacks in Missouri and other slave 
states had to pay special taxes, needed special permission to live in the 
states, were unable to leave the state and return, and were denied access to 
education—not merely public education, but any education.  Most of the 
slave states made it a crime to educate any blacks, slave or free.  The slave 
states prohibited free blacks from entering numerous professions or owning 
certain kinds of property.  Under some circumstances the slave states even 
prohibited free blacks from legally marrying or raising their own children.  
Because a marriage is a contract, no slave could ever be legally married, 
even if the master provided a minister, a judge, or some other official to 
perform a marriage ceremony.  Marriages of slaves had no validity at law, 
and the parties to slave marriages had no legally enforceable rights.  As 
Thomas R.R. Cobb noted in his authoritative treatise on the law of slavery in 
1858, “[t]he inability of the slave to contract extends to the marriage 
contract.”108  Thus, a free black man married to a slave woman had 
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absolutely no control over his children or his wife.  His wife’s master could 
sell his children or his wife whenever he wanted.  He could also forbid the 
free black husband from even seeing his slave wife.109  All marriages 
involving slaves were marriages in name only, and had no status at law.  
Thus, Dred Scott’s marriage to the slave Harriet had absolutely no legal 
validity. 
Dred Scott, even if free, was certainly not a citizen of Missouri.  Thus, 
Taney was correct that the Court did not have jurisdiction in the case.  Dred 
Scott had no standing to sue.  Taney surely overstated the limitations on 
black citizenship because in a half-dozen or so northern states blacks clearly 
had state citizenship.110  But, Taney was not entirely wrong in concluding 
that for most purposes free blacks in the United States were not citizens and 
had not ever been considered citizens. 
There is yet another aspect of the citizenship question.  If Dred Scott 
was a citizen, how did he become a citizen?  The Naturalization Act of 1790 
prohibited the naturalization of blacks.111  Dred Scott was born a slave, and 
clearly no one in 1857 believed that slaves were citizens.  So how did Dred 
Scott become a citizen of Missouri or the United States even if he had 
gained his freedom by living in Illinois or the Wisconsin Territory?  He was 
not a native-born citizen and he had never been naturalized.  There was no 
legal theory that would have made Dred Scott a citizen in 1854 when he 
filed suit in federal court.  Thus, again, the issue is this: was Taney correct in 
holding that Dred Scott was not a citizen and thus was unable to sue in 
federal court?  The answer is surely yes. 
VI.  DID THE COURT OVERREACH IN STRIKING DOWN THE MISSOURI 
COMPROMISE? 
The other major critique of Taney’s opinion involved the issues of 
territorial governance and Taney’s holding that Congress could not ban 
slavery in the territories.  I agree completely with Professor Farber that 
 
 109.  These same circumstances would have applied to free women married to slave men, except 
that her children would have been free because she was free. 
 110.  In 1860 blacks had the same voting rights as whites in five states: Massachusetts, Vermont, 
New Hampshire, Maine, and Rhode Island.  See Finkelman, supra note 102, at 420–21, 425.  Blacks 
with a sufficient amount of property could vote in New York, and blacks could vote in elections 
involving appropriates for public schools in Michigan.  Id. at 425 nn.g & i.  By 1860, free blacks had 
held elective or appointive office in Ohio, New York, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, and 
Rhode Island.  See Paul Finkelman, Not Only the Judges’ Robes Were Black: African-American 
Lawyers as Social Engineers, 47 STAN. L. REV. 161, 174 (1994); Finkelman, supra note 102, at 477; 
see also ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AFRICAN AMERICAN HISTORY, 1619–1895: FROM THE COLONIAL 
PERIOD TO THE AGE OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS (Paul Finkelman ed., 2006).  At a minimum, blacks 
were citizens of any states where they could hold office or vote.  But, the number of blacks in these 
states was miniscule in comparison with the four million slaves and quarter of a million free blacks 
in the South who had almost no legal rights at all. 
 111.  See Naturalization Act of 1790, ch. 3, § 1, 1 Stat. 103 (1790). 
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Taney’s assertion that Congress lacked a general power to regulate the 
territories is nonsensical.112  It is poorly reasoned and absurd.  It is an 
embarrassing attempt to make an argument that should never have been 
made.  Even Justice Catron specifically refused to accept it in concurring 
with the rest of Taney’s opinion.113  It was also an argument that Taney did 
not really have to make.  Taney’s narrower argument—that Congress could 
not ban slavery in the territories—was much stronger. 
Taney’s argument on slavery in the territories was coherent and 
reasonable for 1857, even though we find it immoral and offensive today.  
Taney argued that slaves were property—which everyone on the Court and 
in Congress agreed was true.  He also argued that the Constitution was pro-
slavery.  Republicans rejected this, as did some abolitionists, like Frederick 
Douglass.  But even most Republicans agreed that Congress had no power to 
end slavery in the states where it already existed.  However, almost all 
Southerners agreed with Taney that the Constitution was pro-slavery, as did 
radical abolitionists like William Lloyd Garrison and Wendell Phillips.  
Many northern conservatives, from Democrats like James Buchanan to 
former Whigs like Millard Fillmore, agreed that the Constitution obligated 
the North to protect slave property in a variety of circumstances.114  Taney 
argued that the Fifth Amendment prohibited the taking of private property 
without due process of law and just compensation.115  Thus, he argued that a 
law which took constitutionally protected property away from Southerners 
merely because they entered a federal territory was not a legitimate law.  He 
wrote: 
[T]he rights of property are united with the rights of person, and 
placed on the same ground by the fifth amendment to the 
Constitution, which provides that no person shall be deprived of 
life, liberty, and property, without due process of law.  And an act 
of Congress which deprives a citizen of the United States of his 
liberty or property, merely because he came himself or brought his 
property into a particular Territory of the United States, and who 
had committed no offence against the laws, could hardly be 
dignified with the name of due process of law.116 
 
 112.  Farber, supra note 2, at 21. 
 113.  Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 383, 519–20 (Catron, J., concurring). 
 114.  See generally PAUL FINKELMAN, MILLARD FILLMORE (2011). 
 115.  Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 450 (majority opinion). 
 116.  Id. 
 70 
If slaves were protected property under the Constitution—as Taney found, as 
almost every white Southerner believed, as many northern abolitionists 
reluctantly concluded, as many northern Whigs and Democrats accepted, 
and as a huge number of modern historians assert—then surely it was a 
denial of due process for Congress to pass legislation that took such property 
away from masters without any trial, hearing, or other aspect of due process 
of law.  Even if Congress was on firm constitutional ground in banning 
slavery in the territories, it was unconstitutional to confiscate this property 
merely for the violation of the territorial boundary. 
Dred Scott’s owner took him to a military base in the Wisconsin 
Territory where slavery was prohibited under the Missouri Compromise.117  
The Compromise was absolutely silent on what happened when slaves were 
brought into the territory.  There was no process for determining if there 
were exceptions to the ban.  One can imagine all sorts of ways that slaves 
might have entered the free territory where some exception might be 
necessary.  One could also certainly imagine that any taking of slave 
property under the Missouri Compromise required some sort of due process 
hearing. 
Finally, Taney’s decision went to the fundamental unfairness—from the 
perspective of Southerners—of a ban on slavery.  The national territories 
were collectively owned by all Americans.  There was something deeply 
unfair about telling people in half the nation that they could not settle in the 
territories with their most valuable and economically productive possessions.  
Striking down the Missouri Compromise ended that unfairness. 
Professor Farber argues that Taney overreached in striking down the 
Missouri Compromise.118  It was unnecessary for the decision and surely 
suspect since he had already determined that the Court lacked jurisdiction to 
hear the case because Dred Scott had no standing to sue.  One might, 
however, view his conclusions on this issue as prudent and legitimate.  
Taney could have dodged this issue, only to have it come up again in a few 
more years.  Judicial economy, if nothing else, dictated that Taney deal with 
the territorial issue and remove it from the political debate.  Beyond that, 
Taney’s decision made great political sense at the time.  The nation wanted a 
final answer that would end the divisive and seemingly interminable debate 
over slavery in the territories.  Taney hoped to do this in a way that was 
entirely consistent with American politics at the time. 
In 1820, in the Missouri Compromise, Congress banned slavery in most 
of the western territories.119  With the exception of the formal organization 
 
 117.  Id. at 394; see also Missouri Compromise, ch. 22, 3 Stat. 545 (1820). 
 118.  Farber, supra note 2, at 19. 
 119.  Missouri Compromise §§1–8. 
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of the Oregon Territory in 1848,120 the passage of the Missouri Compromise 
was the last time Congress ever limited slavery in the territories until the 
Civil War.  After 1820 Congress annexed Florida and Texas, allowing 
slavery in both.  In 1850 Congress allowed slavery in all the new territories 
acquired from Mexico, except California, which entered the Union as a free 
state.121  The status of slavery in California was not dictated by Congress; 
however, it was consistent with the wishes of the settlers.122  In 1854 
Congress repealed the Missouri Compromise for all the territory left from 
the Louisiana Purchase except Minnesota, where Dred Scott had lived.123  
When the Court heard Dred Scott, slavery was legal in every federal territory 
except Minnesota and the Oregon country (modern day Oregon, 
Washington, and part of Idaho).  These were the only territories that Taney’s 
opinion affected.  Congress had already allowed slavery in all of the rest of 
the West.  In 1856 the new Republican party ran a popular national hero, 
John C. Frémont, for president on a ticket that promised to ban slavery in the 
territories. 124  This party lost.  Thus, for Taney, the ruling on slavery in the 
territories simply reaffirmed what Congress had done in 1850 and 1854, and 
what the electorate had decided in 1856.  In this context, was it so 
outrageous for Taney to conclude that Congress could not ban slavery in the 
few remaining territories? 
As early as the 1840s, members of Congress had been suggesting that 
the Supreme Court decide the issue of slavery in the territories.  This idea 
began not with a pro-slavery Southerner, but with a moderate northern 
Democrat, Senator Lewis Cass of Michigan, who represented the most 
 
 120.  The act establishing the Oregon Territory in 1848 applied the Northwest Ordinance to the 
territory, and thus by implication banned slavery there.  Act of Aug. 14, 1848, 9 Stat. 323.  Almost 
everyone in the nation believed that Oregon was effectively, although not explicitly, covered by the 
Missouri Compromise, and thus extending the ban on slavery in the Northwest Ordinance was a 
more or less pro forma implementation of what everyone at the time assumed to be the rule for 
Oregon.  Given the territory’s distance from the South—it was further away from the South than any 
other territory—it is not surprising that Congress did this, even though at the time the South had a 
majority in the Senate and there was a pro-slavery southern president—James K. Polk—in the White 
House. 
 121.  For a discussion of the passage of the Compromise of 1850 and its implications for slavery, 
see FINKELMAN, supra note 114, at 101–25. 
 122.  Paul Finkelman, The Cost of Compromise and the Covenant with Death, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 
845, 857 (2011). 
 123.  Act of May 30, 1854, ch. 59, 10 Stat. 277. 
 124.  Republican Party Platform of 1856, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29619#axzz1bZcmd029 (last visited Nov. 11, 
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racially progressive state in the Midwest.125  By 1857 there was strong 
support for a constitutional decision that would take the divisive issue off of 
the political table.  Taney accepted the challenge.  It may have been a 
mistake to do so, but it was hardly outrageous. 
VII.  WHY DO WE HATE DRED SCOTT? 
So, why do we hate Dred Scott?  Why is it the most despised case in our 
constitutional canon?  Why does Professor Farber so vigorously argue that it 
is our worst decision? 
I think the answer is that we hate Dred Scott because it was in fact far 
closer to the truth than we want to admit.  Taney described the Founding as a 
period when blacks were considered “beings of an inferior order, and 
altogether unfit to associate with the white race, either in social or political 
relations; and so far inferior, that they had no rights which the white man 
was bound to respect.”126  We hate the decision because it is embarrassing to 
remember that we had a pro-slavery constitution.  Farber asserts that Taney 
was reading “his own racism into the Constitution.”127  But he was not doing 
this.  The racism was there at the Founding, as well as in 1857.  Taney was 
merely reminding the nation that the Constitution was a slaveholder’s 
constitution, and that the United States was a slaveholder’s republic.  Since 
1788, with the exception of John Adams and John Quincy Adams, every 
president had been a slaveholder or a northern doughface—a northern man 
with southern principles.  With the exception of about five years in the late 
1820s and early 1830s, Southerners were a majority on the Supreme Court.  
Pro-slavery men dominated cabinets and Congress.  Blacks had voted in a 
number of states on the same basis as whites in at the founding and in the 
1790s.  But in four of those states blacks had lost those rights.128  We are 
uncomfortable admitting that in 1857 the value of slaves in the United States 
exceeded the value of any other type of private property except real estate.  
We do not like to admit—we would rather forget—that in the history of the 
Supreme Court leading up to Dred Scott, only two Justices—Gabriel Duvall 
and John McLean—had ever spoken out in favor of the rights of free blacks 
 
 125.  See Roy E. Finkenbine, A Beacon of Liberty on the Great Lakes: Race, Slavery, and the Law 
in Antebellum Michigan, in THE HISTORY OF MICHIGAN LAW 83 (Paul Finkelman & Martin J. 
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 126.  Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407 (1857). 
 127.  Farber, supra note 2, at 31. 
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and against slavery in a Supreme Court opinion.129  These were always 
dissents.130  Except for a few minor cases, usually involving the 
interpretation of state law, the Supreme Court had always sided with slavery, 
not freedom.  Even the famous Amistad case131 was not about black freedom, 
but about the interpretation of a treaty with Spain, and the correct 
understanding that the Africans on the ship were never legally slaves.  We 
conveniently ignore, as Steven Spielberg did in his movie,132 that Justice 
Joseph Story ordered that the slave cabin boy on the ship be returned to his 
Cuban master.  We forget that Chief Justice Marshall upheld the legality of 
the African slave trade133 and that Justice Story ruled that the free states had 
no constitutional right to pass any legislation to protect free blacks from 
kidnapping or mistaken seizure under the Fugitive Slave Law.134 
We don’t like Taney’s opinion because it reflects, far more than we 
want to admit, the kind of constitution we had and the kind of country we 
had created.  We wish to forget that the Constitution made slavery 
impregnable from abolition by political means.  If nothing else, the 
requirement that three-quarters of the states ratify any amendment gave the 
slave states a perpetual guarantee that slavery could never be abolished by 
the national government.  Had eleven slave states never seceded, to this day 
it would be impossible to end slavery by constitutional amendment.135 
Lincoln effectively attacked Dred Scott by arguing that it would lead to 
a nationalization of slavery: “We shall lie down pleasantly dreaming that the 
people of Missouri are on the verge of making their State free; and we shall 
awake to the reality, instead, that the Supreme Court has made Illinois a 
 
 129.  A number of Justices had attacked the African slave trade in opinions; but, this commerce 
was easily distinguished from slaveholding itself.  See for example, Justice Marshall’s assertion in 
The Antelope, that while the African slave trade was “contrary to the law of nature,” it was 
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 132.  See AMISTAD (Dreamworks SKG 1997). 
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 134.  See Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 625–26. 
 135.  In 1860 there were fifteen slave states.  To outvote them would have required a sixty state 
union. 
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slave State.”136  This was not unreasonable, given the political winds of the 
age.  Lincoln helped reverse those winds, and rode his critique of Dred Scott 
to the White House.  Because we venerate Lincoln—and properly so—we 
tend to buy his argument that Dred Scott was constitutionally wrong.  Yet, at 
most, it constituted overreaching and an idiotic reading of the territories 
clause that was utterly unnecessary for the outcome or for any of the big 
constitutional questions that Taney tried to settle. 
One final thought.  My goal is not to rehabilitate Dred Scott, or Chief 
Justice Taney, but to place Dred Scott in its historical and constitutional 
context.  Yet, there may be a silver lining in Dred Scott that we should 
consider.  In Dred Scott, Chief Justice Taney held that the Constitution and 
the Bill of Rights applied to all federal jurisdictions—that the Constitution 
follows the flag.  Sadly, the United States Supreme Court failed to follow 
this idea in the wake of the Spanish-American War.  In the Insular Cases the 
Court held that the Constitution did not apply to the newly acquired 
territories, populated by the “colored people” in Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the 
Philippines.137  Perhaps today, in 2011, it is worth revisiting Dred Scott to 
consider whether the Bill of Rights ought to apply to Guantanamo and other 
places where the flag flies. 
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